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The Case of the Greenland Shrimp Fishery
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Abstract   A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented,
focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on
the fisherman’s incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery,
either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only constraints are
the hold capacity and the length of the season, the fisherman may have rational
incentives to discard/highgrade, if the marginal trip profit of an extra fishing
day is greater than the average trip profit. Regulation by TAC does not change
the incentives to discard. However, under INTQs and ITQs, the incentives to dis-
card increase. The incentives to discard decrease under ITQs compared to
INTQs, if the unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The
model is applied to the Greenland shrimp fishery, where it demonstrates the re-
ported discard behavior in the fishery. Finally, different regulations of discard
are applied and discussed in the model. The analysis suggests that regulation of
fishing days could be a promising alternative to usual suggested measures like
tax/subsidies and landings obligations.
Key words   Discard, Greenland, highgrading, incentives, INTQs, ITQs, shrimp.
Introduction
Discarding of fish with positive social value is a result of the disconnection between
the behavior of the fishers and the incentives produced by the managers.1 Discards
are also due to incomplete structured property rights (e.g., open access or even
ITQs) which are a property right to a resource flow but not the resource stock itself.
In these cases the management does not provide incentives to the fishers which in-
duce behavior in accordance with a socially optimal fishery. However, the manage-
ment agency often indirectly accepts discards which could be the result of a regula-
tion with the purpose to reduce the short-run net economic benefit of the fishery.
The alternative could be an uncontrolled growth of fishing effort with even more
economic waste than the discards (EEC Commission 1992).
Reports of discards of valuable species are numerous (Lehmann and Degel
1991; EEC commission 1992; Huppert et al.1992) and the discards occur under sev-
eral different regulatory frameworks. The discard problem has been discussed in the
literature mainly with reference to regulation by Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs) (Copes 1986) with the exceptions of Arnason (1994), Anderson (1994), and
Clark (1985).
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Discards may be induced by regulation, but from an economic point of view,
discarding is efficient in cases where the marginal costs of discarding are less than
the marginal benefits of discarding (Arnason 1994). In this case the economic waste
of not discarding is greater than the waste of discarding.2
The specific regulation of discarding differs from country to country. In Danish
fisheries landings of species below the minimum landing size and landings beyond
the allowed quotas are not permitted. The fishermen have, in both cases, the choice
to either discard or land the catch illegally. Regulation of mesh size has an indirect
effect on discarding through the influence on the size distribution of the catch.
In Norway only discards of viable species are allowed; dead or dying species
must be landed. However, it is not permitted to catch fish below a given minimum
landing size and to catch illegal bycatches. Therefore, if the fishery is conducted in
an area where small size fish or bycatches are over-represented, the fishery must
stop and the vessel has to move to another area. The discard ban was mainly im-
posed to prevent discarding of fish larger than the minimum landing size. In the
Greenland shrimp fishery the catch of shrimps greater than 2 grams must be landed,
i.e., discarding is only allowed of shrimps smaller than 2 grams.
The purpose of this paper is to address the discard problem from an economic
point of view and to evaluate the incentives of the individual fisher to discard under
different regulatory frameworks. The paper focuses on discarding of valuable spe-
cies, which may be illegal or legal. The model does not include the enforcement is-
sue, so the approach is partial. The paper addresses the incentives to discard and not
necessarily the actual level of discarding.
It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/
multisize, where the only constraints are the hold capacity and the length of the sea-
son, the fisher may have rational incentives to discard/highgrade if the marginal trip
profit of an extra fishing day is greater than average trip profit. An important result
obtained shows that changes in the price of the discarded species/size categories in-
fluence the incentives to discard more than changes in the landed species/size cat-
egories. Regulation by TAC does not change the incentives to discard. However, un-
der Individual Non-Transferable Quotas (INTQs) and ITQs, the incentives to discard
increase. Under ITQs the incentives to discard decrease compared to INTQs if the
unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The analysis suggests
that regulation of fishing days could be a promising alternative to the usual sug-
gested measures such as taxes/subsidies and landings obligations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains some basic consid-
erations. Then a discard model for an individual vessel is formulated. The model is
solved for an nonregulated fishery and the conditions for profitable discarding is
found. The model is also solved subject to different regulation systems. The
Greenland shrimp fishery was chosen for the study, because they have had INTQs
and now have ITQs implemented. The model is applied to the Greenland shrimp
fishery and different instruments to reduce discard are applied in the model. The pa-
per closes with discussion and conclusions.
Basic Considerations
Discarding of fish requires that the fishery operates with different grades (Arnason
1994). It can be a single species fishery with size divided catches, or a multispecies
2 Discarding may be efficient from the viewpoint of private firms, but inefficient from the perspective of
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fishery, where the species receive different prices, or a combination of both. The di-
vision of catch into different grades is a result of either regulation (e.g., minimum
landing size) or different economic grades, i.e., different purpose and/or value or a
combination of both.
Three different types of constraints may influence the level of discards. First,
there are economic constraints. Species with no market value are usually discarded
at sea, and species with a positive market value may be discarded if the costs of han-
dling, storage, and landing exceed the market value. Second, there are legal con-
straints, which include minimum landing size, bycatch rules, and quotas. Legal con-
straints tend to increase discarding, e.g., when the catch of a valuable bycatch spe-
cies is above the allowed quantity. Third, there are technical constraints. Examples
of technical constraints are hold and sorting capacity, and durability of the catch be-
fore turning it into a product that can be stored in the hold. For a given trip the hold
capacity can induce highgrading, i.e., discarding of low value sizes/species to make
room for high value sizes/species. In a given fishery several of the constraints are
usually present at the same time. For example, the Danish mixed fishery for human
consumption in the North Sea contains elements of all three types of constraints.
The model in the next section is relatively simple with respect to these con-
straints. At the outset, there is only one technical constraint, the hold capacity. In a
later section different legal constraints representing the regulatory framework are
added. It is shown that even in this simple model discarding can be profitable.
The Model
In order to explain the rationality of discarding valuable species, the focus must be
the individual fisher. The model must describe how fishers will operate in a specific
fishery. It is assumed that fishers maximize profit one season at a time and that fish-
ers decide on the number of trips N,3 the length of each trip E,4 and the discard per
trip Dj of size category j to maximize profit for the season, see equation (1). The an-
nual fixed cost can be disregarded, given the short time period considered. The
model is formulated here as a single species model with different sizes but can also
be interpreted as a multispecies model. The model can be seen as an extension of the
models by Clark (1985) and Anderson (1994).
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3 Assume that the parameters remain constant throughout the year (i is an index of the trip number), i.e.,
yi = y and aij = aj all the trips will be of equal length, Ei = E, and the discard per trip, dij = dj, is equal as
well.
4 The implicit assumption in mathematical programming models is that the production technology is
separable, i.e., inputs (and outputs) can be combined to a single composite input, normally represented
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ajyE – Dj ≥  0    j = 1, …, J (3)
(– ) ay E D jj j
J
= ∑ 1  ≤  K (4)
N, E, Dj ≥  0    j = 1, …, J (5)
The trip profit, π (E, dj) in equation (1), consists of four parts. The first part is the
revenue,  j
J
= ∑ 1[pj(ajyE – Dj)]. The total catch per trip is catch per unit effort y, which
is assumed constant throughout the year, times effort per trip E. The landings of
each size category j is the total catch times the size distribution aj less the discard
Dj. Revenue is given by landings multiplied by the market prices, pj. The market
prices are assumed exogenously given at the vessel level and hence constant.
The next three terms of the trip profit is the trip cost. Following Arnason (1994)
this cost is divided into three parts: landing cost, discarding cost, and effort or har-
vesting cost.5 In traditional fisheries models, the landing and discarding cost are nor-
mally ignored. The landing cost is cost connected to retaining (and if necessary pro-
cessing) the catch and landing it, see Arnason (1994). The landing cost, the second
part of the trip profit, clj(ajyE – Dj), is assumed to be proportional with the landings
of each grade, i.e., clj is the variable cost of landing one unit of catch. Anderson
(1994) does not include landing cost. The third part of the trip profit is the discard-
ing cost, cdDj. It is assumed that the marginal discarding cost is constant and inde-
pendent of size categories, i.e., cd is the variable cost of discarding one unit of catch.
The fourth part of the trip profit is the cost of effort, CE(E), with CE′  > 0 and CE″  > 0.
Further it is assumed that the fixed trip cost is positive, i.e., CE(0) > 0.6 This means
that there are costs depending on the number of trips.
The first constraint (2), the season constraint, limits the length of the season to
T. Hence the number of trips multiplied by the trip length (including steaming and
harbor time E0 between two trips) must be less than the length of the season. If this
season constraint holds with equality, then the objective is to maximize the profit
per trip-day, i.e., the average trip profit. The second constraint (3), the landing con-
straint, restricts the landings of each size category to be nonnegative (discards of
each grade cannot exceed the catch of each grade). The third constraint (4), the hold
constraint, requires the total landings per trip to be less than or equal to the hold ca-
pacity (K) of the vessel. Finally, the constraints in equation (5) restrict the variables
to be non-negative.
This problem is so far without any kind of regulation. If, for example, a total
allowable catch (TAC) is introduced in the model, the length of the season T will be
further limited. Individual quotas may also be analyzed in this model, while analysis
of regulation by mesh size, closed areas, and other technical measures requires a
more detailed model with respect to the biological specification.
Solution of the Model
The number of trips N is an integer. However the solution is found without restrict-
ing N to be an integer to provide more insight into solutions close to the optimal so-
lution. This approach is recommended in Zionts (1974), when the value of the inte-
5 A reviewer suggested that the division of cost into three parts imposes strong restrictions on the substi-
tution possibilities in the production technology.
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ger is expected to be somewhat larger than 1. Numerical simulations can be used to
find the optimal integer value afterwards.7
The Lagrange-function of the problem reads:
L =  N p a yE D cl a yE D c D CE E jj j jj j d j j
J (– ) – (– ) – – ( ) [] {} = ∑ 1
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The first order conditions are:
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λ 1, λ 2j, λ 3 ≥  0      j = 1, …, J (13)
From equation (11) it is seen that the discard level of size j is positive if the mar-
ginal cost of discarding, which is cd + pj, is smaller than the marginal benefit of dis-
carding clj. This requires at least that pj – clj < 0, i.e., the marginal cost related to
retain and land the catch is larger than the market price. If pj – clj > 0, then discard-
ing might be profitable if the hold constraint (4) is binding, i.e., λ 3 > 0. It will be
shown in the next section that a binding hold constraint is only a necessary condi-
tion for discarding, not a sufficient condition. Net market prices npj for size j can
without any loss of generality be defined as npj = pj – clj. It is assumed in the fol-
lowing that npj > 0. The size categories are ordered relatively to the net market
price, i.e., np1 < np2 < ... < npj < ... < npJ.
For a given trip length it is relatively easy to determine the optimal discard
level. Discarding is a costly activity. Therefore, for a given trip length, the highest
7 Of course pathological examples can be constructed, where the optimal integer solution is not close to
the optimal non-integer solution.Vestergaard 252
possible value of the catch is obtained by retaining the whole catch if the hold constraint
is not binding, see appendix. If the hold constraint is binding, only the necessary amount
should be discarded. It is optimal first to discard the cheapest size, i.e., size 1.
In order to determine the solution, each of the possible cases where the inequal-
ity constraints (2)-(5) are binding or not binding have to be examined. Since there
are 2 + J + 2 + J constraints there will be 22+J+2+J configurations possible at the op-
timum. Because the purpose here is to investigate the solution where discarding is
profitable, the number of cases to examine is much fewer.
Assume that profit is positive, i.e., N > 0 and E > 0 and equations (7) and (9)
hold with equality. When the season constraint (2) is binding, the corresponding
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The right-hand-side of equation (14) is the average trip profit (ATP), which is posi-
tive. Therefore at the optimum, the season constraint will be binding. Substituting
equation (14) into first order condition (9) gives:
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This equation together with equation (11) forms the basis for analyzing a number of
cases depending on which constraints are binding for the fishing activity. In the ap-
pendix the different cases are analyzed.8 Here we will concentrate on the cases
where discarding of size-category just becomes profitable, i.e., two cases: (i) D1 > 0
and the landing constraint (3) is nonbinding; and (ii) D1 > 0 and the landing con-
straint is binding.
Conditions for Profitable Discarding
If discarding of size category 1 is optimal, then equation (11) holds as an equality.
The solution where discarding of size 1 is optimal can then be found by solving
equation (15) for λ 3 and substituting the expression into equation (11) for j = 1 to
give an expression for the decision to discard:
np a y CE E np c y jj j
J
d = ∑ ′ + 1 1 –( ) – ( ) (16)























The left-hand-side of equation (16) represents the marginal trip profit (MTP),
np a y jj j
J
= ∑ 1  – CE′ (E) and the costs of discarding one day’s catch (DC1), (np1 + cd)y.
8 There are 21+J+J configuration possibilities left.Discard Behavior, Highgrading, and Regulation 253
An extra fishing day yields MTP, but in order to make room for the catch, size 1 is dis-
carded at the costs of foregone net revenue (np1), and discarding cost (cd), of one day’s
catch, y. The two first terms on the right-hand-side show ATP. The last term on the right-
hand-side is the shadow value of size 1 to discard expressed in terms of one day’s catch
of landed size categories. Discarding (of size category 1) is optimal if MTP – DC1 >
ATP(D1 = 0). Discarding continues until MTP – DC1 = ATP(D1 > 0), i.e., equation
(16) is obtained. This corresponds to maximum of ATP. If the landing constraint (3)
becomes binding such that further discarding of size 1 is not possible, then λ 21 > 0.
Discarding is optimal if marginal benefits (MTP) are greater than marginal
costs, the latter consisting of discarding cost (DC1) plus average trip profit (ATP).
The average trip profit is the opportunity cost of a day, time cost, because the season is
limited. If as assumed in Anderson (1994) the goal was to maximize the trip profit (i.e.,
no season limit) then the trip will continue until MTP – DC1 = 0 or the discard con-
straint is binding, and consequently a trip will last longer in the model of Anderson.
In figure 1 the trip profit is shown as a function of the trip length. If the trip
length is less than E1, where the hold capacity is binding, then there is no discard-
ing. If the trip length is between E1 and E2 then size 1 is discarded. If the trip length
is between E2 and E3 then size 2 is also discarded. In general, if the trip length is
between Ek and Ek+1, then size k is discarded. The optimal trip length E* is found
where the average trip profit is maximized.
Further insight into conditions for profitable discarding is possible when equa-
tion (16) is manipulated to show the total marginal cost of replacing a unit of size 1
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Figure 1.  Optimal Trip LengthVestergaard 254
The left-hand-side of equation (17) expresses the benefit of replacing a unit of size 1
with a weighted unit of the landed size categories. The cost of highgrading are captured
in the brackets on the right-hand-side of equation (17) and involve, expressed in units of
producing an extra unit of landed size categories: (i) the marginal effort cost, (ii) the av-
erage trip profit (i.e., the time cost), and (iii) the marginal cost of discarding. In
Huppert, Anderson, and Harding (1992) and Anderson (1994) only the first and the
third parts of the costs are mentioned. Equation (17) says that discarding is optimal
when the difference between the average net price of the landed size categories and
the net price of the discarded size category compensates for the cost of discarding.
As Anderson (1994) points out, price-differences and a binding hold constraint
are not enough to induce discarding. The price-difference has to be sufficiently large
to compensate for the costs, see equation (17). Discarding can be profitable even if
the net market price is positive. If the prices used in the model reflect social value,
and hold capacity is costly, then the conclusions also remain in force from a social
point of view (Anderson 1994).
Neither equation (16) nor (17) explicitly expresses the discard level, but instead
the incentives to discard are expressed. If the left-hand-side increases (decreases)
then the incentives to discard increase (decrease), while if the right-hand-side in-
creases (decreases) then the incentives to discard decrease (increase). The incentives
are expressed on a trip level.
The incentives to discard expressed in equation (17) depend on E0, y, ATP, CE′ ,
aj, cd, and pj. From equation (17) the following conclusions can be made:
1. If the steaming time E0 increases, then the incentives to discard increase. The
average trip profit then decreases and then the fishing time, E, or λ 21 must in-
crease as the right-hand-side still has to be equal to the constant left-hand-side.
In figure 1 the trip profit curve moves to the right, when E0 increases, leading
to longer trips.
From equation (17) it can be shown that the shorter the steaming time, the
less the price of the landed size categories will influence the incentives. At the
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This result is different from the result of Anderson (1994). The incentives to
discard depends not on the price difference, but on the price level of the dis-
carded size.
2. If the share of size category 1, a1, increases, then the incentives to discard de-
crease.
3. Because the firm operates where the average effort cost (AEC) is greater than or
equal to the marginal effort cost (MEC), the main difference between AEC and
MEC is the fixed trip cost CE(0). A rise in fixed trip cost and AEC (i.e., ATP
decreases) increases the incentives to discard. In figure 1 the trip profit curve
moves downward as fixed trip cost increases.
4. The price of size category 1, p1, influences the incentives to discard more than
the weighted price of the other size categories. To see this, in figure 2 the profit
curve in the middle shows the initial situation with E2 as the optimal trip length.
If the price of the discarded size 1 increases, then MTP increases, but the DC1Discard Behavior, Highgrading, and Regulation 255
increases as well. Therefore the profit curve will break more at E1 than before.
In figure 2, E1 becomes the optimal trip length. If the prices of other sizes de-
crease then the slope of the profit curve becomes less steep for every E. In fig-
ure 2 the optimal trip length is unchanged, i.e., E2. This information can be uti-
lized when discard management is designed. In equation (17) only the expres-
sion on the left-hand-side will change with changes in the price of the discarded
size 1, while corresponding changes in the weighted price of the landed size
categories change both the expression on the left-hand-side and the term with
the time cost on the right-hand-side in the same direction.
Regulation
In this section the effects on the discard behavior of three different regulation sys-
tems are analyzed and compared. The three systems are total allowable catch (TAC),
individual non-transferable quotas (INTQs) and individual transferable quotas
(ITQs). There are several reasons for this choice. The three regulation systems are
distinct systems. Secondly, they often represent the evolution of the management
system in many fisheries from open access, over TAC and restricted access, to indi-
vidual quotas. Arnason (1994) and Anderson (1994) analyzed the discard problem
under open access and ITQs. It is relevant, however, to compare INTQs with ITQs,
because in some fisheries where ITQs have been introduced there have been restric-
tions on the transferability or thin ITQs markets, which de facto change the ITQs to
INTQs [see Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell (1995) for an overview].
Figure 2.  Effect of Changes in PricesVestergaard 256
Total Allowable Catch
Regulation by TAC can be introduced into the model by reducing the length of the
season T. If TAC is supposed to reduce the total (reported) catch, then the fishery
will close before the end of a normal season. As the length of the season is not in-
cluded in the conditions (7)-(11), the discard behavior remains unchanged. But the
total discard (and the total catch) per vessel will decline as the number of trips fall.
This is a short-run consideration, however. Over time, as a possible positive profit
attracts new fishers, the season becomes even shorter which may lead to decreasing
CPUE. The result is that the incentives to discard decrease.
Individual Nontransferable Quotas
The system of INTQs allocates to each fishing unit a catch quota, which limits the
harvest (or landings) within the season.
INTQs can be introduced in the model (1)-(5) by including the condition that total
landings must be smaller than or equal to the quota Q, i.e., the quota constraint:
N a yE D jj j
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The first order conditions are then:
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Assume as before that profit is positive, i.e., equations (20) and (22) hold with
equality. For a given trip length E, it is more complicated to determine the discard
due to the interaction between N and Dj in the quota constraint (19). The general
point here is that if both the quota and the season constraints are binding, then in-
creased discarding for a given trip length will lead to a nonbinding quota constraint,
because N, due to the season constraint cannot increase. Consequently further in-
creases in discarding are nonoptimal.
If the quota constraint is not binding, then the solution is the same as before. It
is therefore assumed in the following analysis that the quota constraint (19) is bind-
ing, i.e., λ 4 > 0.
Introduction of INTQs in a Situation Where Discarding was Unprofitable
In this section and the next it is considered whether introducing INTQs changes the
incentives to discard compared to situations without regulation, where it is either
optimal to land the entire catch or optimal to discard some of the catch. The analysis
takes place in two steps. In the first step, the trip length is fixed and it is investi-
gated whether it is optimal to discard. In the second step, we see whether it is opti-
mal to change the trip length.
Introducing a quota and keeping the trip length fixed implies that the season
constraint (2) becomes nonbinding λ 1 = 0, because the number of trips must fall due
to a binding quota constraint (by assumption). Solving equation (20) for λ 4 and in-
serting in equation (24) for j = 1 gives that discarding is optimal if:















Equation (27) simply says that if the average profit per unit fish, which is the benefit of
one unit of landed fish, is greater than the total marginal discarding cost of one unit of
size 1 fish, then discarding is optimal. Hence even when the hold constraint is nonbind-
ing, it can be optimal to discard. It has been argued (Anon. 1993) that highgrading under
individual quotas is due to limited hold capacity, but this is not necessarily the case.
If discarding is optimal then it continues to increase until either the season con-
straint is binding or one of the discard constraints is binding and it is not profitable
to continue with the next size. When discarding increases, the number of trips can
be raised (however limited by the quota constraint), because the landings per trip de-
crease. But the discard and hence the number of trips can only be increased to a cer-
tain limit determined by the season constraint.
If equation (27) does not hold, then it depends on the hold constraint whether it
is optimal to change the trip length. If the hold constraint is nonbinding then the op-
timal trip length is reduced slightly.9 If the hold constraint is binding and MTP –
(np1 + cd)y > 010 then it is optimal to extend the trip and start discarding.
If equation (27) is fulfilled, then the optimal trip length can decrease or in-
crease, but discarding will still be optimal.
The incentives to discard are, compared to the nonregulated case, increased.
9 From equation (22) the optimal trip length is found where MTP = ATP of fishing days. In the non-
regulated case the optimality condition was MTP = ATP of trip days. ATP of fishing days is lesser than
ATP of trip days, so MTP has to be bigger than before and therefore the optimal trip length is reduced.
10 Solve equation (22) for λ 3 and insert in equation (24).Vestergaard 258
Introduction of INTQ in a Situation where Discarding was Profitable
Introduction of a binding quota in this situation results in increasing discarding, if
profit per landed unit is greater than total marginal discarding costs of the relevant
size j. Discarding stops increasing when either one of the discard constraints be-
comes binding and it is unprofitable to continue with the next size or the season
constraint becomes binding. The optimal trip length will increase in these cases.11
If it is nonoptimal to increase the discard, then the hold constraint is still bind-
ing (now together with the quota constraint). In this case, it is optimal to increase
the trip length and hence the discarding, if MTP is greater than the costs of discard-
ing one day’s catch of the relevant sizes; otherwise the trip length remains the same.
As before, compared to the nonregulated case, the incentives to discard are in-
creased.
In the further analysis, the situation is relevant where the hold, season, and
quota constraints are binding. If all three constraints are binding, then substituting
λ 1 [from equation (20)] and λ 3 [from equation (22)] into equation (24) for j = 1 gives
the following expression:
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J –( ) – ( ) 1 1 + = ∑  – 
np a yE D c D CE E
EE
jj j d j j





+ λλ λ 4
1
0
















If some discarding is optimal, then equation (28) holds as an equality. If equation
(28) is compared to the situation without any regulation [equation (16)], the fifth
term in equation (28) (the term with λ 4) makes the difference. The trip lasts longer
and increases the incentives to discard compared to the nonregulated case.
Individual Transferable Quotas
If it is possible to trade quota,12 then the quota constraint (19) and the objective
function (1) change. The quota constraint has to take into account that quota units
can be sold and bought and can be written:
Na y E D Q jj j
J (– ) = ∑ [] ≤ 1 (29)
where, Q is the amount of quota units after trading has occurred. The quota units are
non-negative:
Q ≥  0 (30)
The objective function changes to:
11 The hold constraint becomes nonbinding. Therefore, not the whole catch of one fishing day has to be
discarded, which reduces the costs of discarding and the optimal trip length increases.
12 As we look only at one year, the quota trade is annual lease.Discard Behavior, Highgrading, and Regulation 259
max ( , )
,, , NED Q j
j
NE D Π= π  =  Nn p a y E D c D C E E s Q jj j d j j
J (– ) – – ( ) – ( – ) [] {} = ∑ 1 Q (31)
where, s is the price per quota unit.
The problem now consists of equations (2)-(5) and equations (29)-(31). The first













If q > 0, then equation (32) says that in optimum the price per unit quota s is equal
to the shadow price of the quota constraint λ 4. Hence if the quota price is lower than
the shadow price under INTQs, s < λ 4, then it is optimal to buy quotas. If the season
constraint (2) is binding, then a larger part of the total season catch is landed with a
larger quota and the discard falls. If the season constraint is nonbinding, then the
number of trips increases with a larger quota which may lead to a binding season
constraint and consequently lower trip length and discard share. If the season con-
straint does not bind, the discard share remains unchanged. This implies that the in-
centives to discard are lower than in the INTQ system. If the quota price is larger
than the shadow price under INTQs, then it is optimal to sell quotas, thereby in-
creasing the incentive to discard.
Compared to TAC/no-regulation the ITQ system will increase the incentives to
discard if the price per unit quota is positive. This increase in discarding incentives
follows from the analysis of INTQs [see equation (28)] because every binding quota
(i.e., positive shadow price) will increase the incentives to discard. This result is dif-
ferent than the result found in Anderson (1994). Anderson found that introduction of
an ITQ system in a situation where highgrading was not profitable will only induce
highgrading, if s > p1 + cd.
In summary, it is not possible to conclude that ITQs will increase the discard;
instead it depends critically on which management system it replaces.
The Greenland Shrimp Fishery
The shrimp fishery on offshore fishing grounds in the Davis Strait started around
1970.13 In 1976 the annual catch reached a level of about 40,000 tonnes and in the
1990s catch over 50,000 tonnes are seen. The participating fleet is multinational.
The main part of the catch is taken by vessels from Greenland (87.1% in 1991) and
Canada (11.8%), but vessels from France, Denmark, and the Faroe Islands also par-
ticipate in the fishery. The offshore fleet of Greenland consists of three types of ves-
sels. A major part of the fishing fleet consists of factory trawlers with processing
plants on board. As a part of the license conditions, one group of these factory trawl-
ers is allowed to process 75% to 90% of the catch on board, whereas a second group
is allowed to process 30% to 50% of the catch only. For both groups, the remaining
catch must be landed to the factories on shore. The third group of vessels participat-
13 This section is based on Christensen and Vestergaard (1993).Vestergaard 260
ing in the offshore fishery is formed by minor boats with no processing plants on
board and no licences to process. The entire catch of this part of the fishing fleet
must be landed to the factories on shore.
Three main products of shrimp are produced. Frozen, unpeeled shrimps which
can be raw or cooked are produced at the processing plants at sea. At the processing
industry on shore, the shrimps are cooked and peeled. Besides the product type, the
sales prices also depend on the size of the shrimp. The commercial fleet commonly
operates with five size categories: count14 50-70, count 70-90, count 90-120, count
120-150, and count 150+.
From 1984 to 1991 the offshore shrimp fishery of Greenland was regulated by
an individual non-transferable quota (INTQ) system. In 1991 the Greenland Home
Rule15 implemented an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system.
According to an observer program, two kinds of discard take place on shrimp
factory trawlers (Lehmann and Degel 1991). Shrimp is discarded partly due to low
quality (quality discard) and partly due to inferior size (size discard), in order to
highgrade the catch. The amount of quality discard is low compared to the size dis-
card. Carlsson and Kanneworff’s (1992) observation program found that the size
discard in the Greenland fleets consists of shrimps less than 8.5 grams, i.e., less than
count 120. The extent of the discard of the Greenland factory trawlers has been esti-
mated based on the information from the observation program, to be about 25% of
the reported catch. Christensen and Vestergaard (1993) estimate the total discard in
1991 to be about 23%.
The regulation of discards is based on command and control. A catch of shrimp
larger than 2 grams must be landed, i.e., discard of shrimp smaller than 2 grams is al-
lowed. It is very difficult to control whether the discard regulation is respected and a
perfect control requires personnel on every vessel, which is an expensive solution.
Instead the Greenland Home Rule controls the vessels by means of spot checks.
Model Results from the Case of Greenland Shrimp Fishery
The basic input parameters are determined from account information from three fac-
tory trawlers, see also Christensen and Vestergaard (1993). The costs are divided
into landing, discard, and effort cost: (i) landing cost depending on the extent of
processing, the retained catch are mainly wages, processing, handling, and sales; (ii)
effort cost depending on the days at sea are mainly fuel, gear, and maintenance; and
(iii) effort cost depending on the number of trips (i.e., fixed trip costs) which are
mainly administration, travel, fuel for steaming, and maintenance.
The landing cost is deducted from the sales prices in order to obtain net market
prices. In order to obtain increasing marginal effort costs a quadratic effort cost
equation is used:
CE(E) = c1·E2 + c2·E + c0
where c0 is the fixed trip costs. The input parameters used in the model are shown in
table 1.
Table 2 reports the results from running the model with the three different regu-
latory systems. The baseline run (i.e., nonregulated fishery) of the model shows that
it is optimal to discard the cheapest size category, but not to the full extent. Even with-
14 Count is defined as number of shrimps per kilogram.
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out any kind of regulation, discarding can be optimal. Sensitivity analysis of fixed
trip costs, steaming and harbor time, catch per unit effort, and hold capacity gives
the expected results. This analysis also shows that the result is relatively robust, i.e.,
large changes in the parameters are necessary to change the discard behavior.
Introducing a binding quota constraint (i.e., INTQs) in the model increases the
discard compared to the previous analysis as expected. Size category 2 is also dis-
carded. The catch level is the same as in the baseline run. The trip length is ex-
panded and the number of trips declines. The shadow price of quota is 3.3 DKK.
This result fits the observed discard behavior in the fishery under INTQs (Lehmann
and Degel 1991; Carlsson and Kanneworff 1992).
Under ITQs the discard decreases when the quota price is lower than the
shadow price of quota, because it is optimal to buy more quota and with binding
season constraint the share of the catch that is discarded must fall. If, for example, the
quota unit price is 2 DKK, then quota units are bought and the discard level decreases. It
consists now only of size category 1. Compared to the baseline run the amount of dis-
card is higher. The opposite result is obtained when the quota price is higher than
the shadow price. For example, with a quota unit price at 4.4 DKK the discard in-
creases, such that size categories 1 and 2 are now discarded to the full extent.
In all cases the catch is at the same level because the season is utilized com-
pletely. The difference is how the catch is divided into landings and discard.
Regulation of Discards
Specific regulation of discards with the purpose of eliminating or reducing discard-
ing can be based on landing obligations, taxes/subsidies, or length of the season.
The analysis of these measures is provided within the case of the shrimp fishery.
Table 2.  Results
ITQ
Nonregulated INTQ s = 2 s = 4.4
Profit (1,000 DKK) 12,094 11,239 11,526 11,351
Catch (tonnes) 1,632 1,670 1,642 1,682
Discard (tonnes) 354 770 460 903
Landings (tonnes) 1,278 900 1,182 779
Trip length 41 59 44 68
Shadowprice of quota (DKK) 3.3 2 4.4
Table 1.  Input Parameters






c0: 1,083,457 c1: 21,000 c2: 100
E0: 3 days y: 10,000 kg/fishing day
K: 300,000 kg T: 176 days Q: 900,000 kgVestergaard 262
Landing Obligations
Landing obligations of size categories that are usually discarded can be imple-
mented by setting a fixed share of the total landings or quota, which has to consist
of the usually discarded size categories at least. The problem with this instrument is
that the share of these size categories varies from vessel to vessel, from area to area,
and over the season, which makes a proper setting of the share almost impossible
(Anderson 1994). A practical policy could be to set an uniform share, but the ques-
tion is whether such a policy can reduce the incentives to discard.
In the nonregulated fishery a landing obligation of a share of the catch beyond
the catch share of the potential discarded sizes 1 and 2 will eliminate the discard of
sizes 1 and 2, but discarding of size 3 is necessary in order to provide the required
share of sizes 1 and 2. Anderson (1994) called this situation lowgrading. Setting a
share of the catch under the discard share will reduce, but not eliminate, the discard.
A landing obligation will reduce the trip length and hence the number of trips and
the landings will increase.
In the quota-based fishery the fixed share is implemented as in Anderson
(1994), so that only a certain share of the quota is allowed to consist of the potential
not-discarded size categories. Then it is up to the fishermen to decide whether to
discard or land the potential discarded sizes.
Under INTQs, setting a proper fixed share of the quota is more difficult. The
problem is that the vessel owner maximizes the value of the part of the quota which
is without landing obligation. This can lead to discards of size categories that were
previously landed. This applies to both shares above and under the discard share.
Therefore this regulation can be forced to be extended to other size categories than
scheduled, which can lead to reactions from the fishers and in the end undermine the
purpose of the regulation. However, introduction of a landing obligation will lead to
reduction or the same level in catch, discard, and trip length, because now possible
discarding costs more. The profit will fall. But if the discards and catch fall, there is
room for increasing the individual quota up to a point, where the catch is the same
as before.16 This will compensate the fishers to some extent.
The situation under ITQs compared to INTQs is in principle the same as before,
i.e., without landing obligations. If the shadow price of quota is greater than the quota
price, then it is optimal to buy quota, and therefore the discard share is on the same level
or smaller than under INTQs. If the required landed share of the quota that has to be
landed is higher than the catch share, then in some cases (not too high quota price) it is
optimal to buy quota beyond landings to meet the landing obligation. Anderson (1994)
also treats this situation, but does it independent of the quota price. If it is optimal to
sell quota, then the discard share is at the same level or, larger than under INTQs.
In general the shadow price of quota is higher under landings obligations than
without landings obligations. Therefore ITQs with landings obligation will, all things
equal, reduce the incentives to discard compared to ITQs without landings obliga-
tions. However implementation of landing obligations in an ITQ fishery may distort
the quota market and influence the number of successful quota trades negatively.
Taxes/Subsidies
It was shown that changes in the prices of the discarded size categories influence the
incentives to discard more than changes in prices of the retained size categories. The
16 It is assumed that the discard is included in the assessment of the stock and hence in the TAC, which
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cause is the season constraint. Therefore the main problem is to find a subsidy level
for the discarded size categories that will eliminate the incentives to discard. If a
budget-neutral regulation is required, then taxing the retained size categories is a
relatively easy task, because this will only influence the incentives to discard in a
limited extent. Obviously taxing and/or subsidizing too hard can induce discards of
higher valued size categories, i.e., lowgrading.
For example, in the nonregulated case of the shrimp fishery, the discard is elimi-
nated by raising the price of size 1 by 2 DKK and decreasing the prices of the other
sizes so that the regulation is budget-neutral. In the INTQ case the situation is more
complicated. The season constraint is binding, but reducing the discards requires that
the trip length decreases and hence the season constraint becomes nonbinding. This
changes the conditions for highgrading such that the prices of the retained size cat-
egories are influenced with the same factor as the discarded sizes. Therefore it is the
price differences that matters if the season constraint is nonbinding.
In our model of the shrimp fishery the discard level can be reduced to contain
only the low valued sizes by raising the prices on size 2 and decreasing the prices of
4 and 5 corresponding so the budget neutrality is obtained. In the model it is pos-
sible to find subsidy levels and tax levels that will lead to elimination of the discard.
Under ITQs, if the quota price is lower than the shadow price of quota obtained
from running the model under INTQs, then raising the price of sizes 1 and 2 and de-
creasing the prices of 4 and 5 correspondingly can eliminate the discard. But as be-
fore the proper levels of subsidies and taxes depend on the quota price. Higher
quota-prices means higher levels of subsidies and taxes. It can be a relatively diffi-
cult task to keep the right levels of subsidies/taxes in a situation with fluctuations in
the quota prices.
Effort Regulation
Instead of introducing landings obligations or subsidy/tax, where extensive and
costly information and control is necessary, then simply reducing the length of the
season may be an alternative. The analysis of ITQs and INTQs in the Greenland
shrimp fishery shows that if the length of the season was reduced, then the discards
could be reduced to the discard level in the nonregulated case. However input con-
trols can distort the composition of factor inputs and lead to higher cost. Therefore
in a proper cost/benefit analysis of management of discard, the change in control
costs, in discard levels, and in the flexibility in planning of the fishing operations
must be considered.
Reducing the length of the season by one-quarter in the model reduces the dis-
card level by reducing the number of trips under ITQs, while under INTQs the dis-
card level is reduced, because the trip length is reduced.
If the catch-composition in some periods consists of more low-valued size cat-
egories, then the fishery in these periods could be closed instead of simply shorten-
ing the season. Hereby low valued categories (often small and young individuals)
are protected and the discard level in general is reduced through a shorter season.
Discussion and Conclusions
In a simple model, where fishers decide the number of trips and trip length over the
season, this paper show that incentives to discard can exist. The only constraints in
the model are the length of season and size of hold. Incentives to discard require the
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costs of replacing the discard, which consists of the discarding cost, effort cost and
time cost. It was also shown that the price of discarded fish influences the incentives
more than the price of the retained fish.
Introduction of different regulations into the fishery may change the incentives
to discard. Under TAC, where the fishery closes when the total quota is landed, the
incentives to discard do not change. The discarded amount and the catch per boat
may decrease, however, because the number of trips decreases.
Under INTQs it was shown that discard per trip increases compared to the TAC/
nonregulated fishery, if the average trip profit per landed unit is larger than the total
marginal cost of discarding individuals of the size in question. If the average trip
profit per landed unit is less than the cost, then discard will also increase if marginal
trip profit per fishing day is larger than the cost of discarding one day’s catch of fish
of the size in question. Otherwise the discard is unchanged. In sum, the incentives to
discard in INTQ fisheries are larger than the incentives to discard in TAC/
nonregulated fisheries.
Whether ITQs compared to INTQs lead to increased incentives to discard de-
pends on the quota price. If the quota price is larger than the shadow price of quota
from INTQs, then it is optimal to sell quota. If it is not optimal to sell the entire
quota and stop fishing, then the incentives to discard are increased. If the quota
price is less than the shadow price, then it is optimal to buy quota and hence the in-
centives to discard decrease. Therefore compared to INTQs the incentives to discard
under ITQs can either fall or increase. If the incentives in ITQ fisheries are com-
pared with the incentives in TAC/nonregulated fisheries, the incentives are in-
creased.
The model is applied to the Greenland Shrimp Fishery in the Davis Strait. Dis-
carding can be optimal even in the nonregulated fishery and the model confirms the
observations made on the discard behavior in INTQ fisheries. Under ITQs the incen-
tives to discard will decrease if the quota price is less than 3.3 DKK.
Three different management measures regarding discard are applied in the
model: taxes and subsidies, landings obligations, and effort regulation. The observa-
tion on the different influence of the prices of different sizes can be used to design
proper levels of taxes and subsidies. It is concluded that limiting the number of fish-
ing days per season in INTQ or ITQ fisheries may be a promising alternative to the
traditional measures, because it is much easier to control fishing days than catch and
landings of different grades/species. Furthermore, relatively detailed information of
catch composition is needed when designing levels of taxes or landings shares.
However, regulating the number of fishing days reduces the flexibility of the fisher-
men. This loss has to be compared with the benefit of reducing the discard.
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Appendix
Solution of the Model (No Regulation)
Hold Constraint (4) is Not Binding, λ 3 = 0
From equation (11) it follows that Dj = 0 and λ 2j = 0. Equation (15) can then be formulated as:
np a y CE E
















The left-hand-side of equation (A1) is the marginal trip profit (MTP) and the right-hand-side
is ATP. The trip continues until MTP is equal to ATP. If the decision was to maximize the trip
profit, then the trip will continue until MTP = 0, i.e., the trip last longer. But if the season is
limited, the extension of the trip reduces the profit which could be obtained on other trips
within the season.
To determine the length of a trip (E) and the number of trips (N), solve equation (A1) for E
and then from equation (2) N can be found.
The Hold Constraint is Binding, λ 3 > 0
Several cases are possible here. In order to simplify the problem, it is assumed that there are
three size categories (J = 3) of fish. If the optimal discard level is positive, it will consist of
category 1 and 2, with 1 as the primary category.17 It is inoptimal to discard the highest val-
ued category, i.e., D3 = 0 and λ 23 = 0. For a given trip length E the discard level of D1 and D2
can be found from equation (4).
Condition for No Discard. If no discarding takes place, then D1, D2, λ 21, and λ 22 = 0. From
equation (11) the following expression can be obtained:
λ 3 ≤  N(np1 + cd) (A2)
17 It is optimal to discard first the cheapest size (p1).Vestergaard 266
Insert λ 3 from equation (A2) into equation (15):
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The left-hand-side of equation (A3) shows the marginal trip profit (MTP) and the loss from
discarding the catch of one fishing day (DC1). The right-hand-side shows the average trip
profit (ATP). The trip continues until the hold constraint becomes binding, where MTP +
DC1 < ATP(D1 = 0). It is optimal to land the whole catch and the number of fishing days can
be determined from equation (4) as K/y.
Conditions for Discard of Size Category 1. Here equation (11) holds with equality for j = 1.
If equation (11) is solve for λ 3 and substituted into equation (15), we get:
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The left-hand-side of (A4) shows the marginal trip profit when discarding size category 1.
The right-hand-side shows the average trip profit which now consists of ATP with no dis-
carding and the average discarding costs. When the hold constraint becomes binding then
discarding of size category 1 is optimal if MTP + DC1 > ATP(D1 = 0). Discarding continues
until MTP + DC1 = ATP(D1 > 0). If the discard constraint (3) becomes binding, then λ 21 > 0
in order to obtain equal-sign in equation (A4).
If λ 21 = 0, then from equation (4) D1 is to be expressed as a function of E and equation
(A4) can be solved for E. If λ 21 > 0, then from equation (3) D1 is expressed as a function of E
and from equation (4) E can be found.18
Discard of Size Category 2. If discarding of size category 2 is optimal, then equation (11)
holds with equal-sign for j = 1 and 2, and eliminating λ 3 from these equations gives an ex-
pression for λ 21:
λ 21 = λ 22 + N(np2 – np1) (A5)
Equation (A5) inserted into equation (A4) yields:
np np
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If discarding of size category 2 is optimal, then the price difference between size-category 3
and 2 is greater than or equal to the costs expressed in the brackets on the right-hand-side of
equation (A6).
18 Then from equation (A4) λ 21 can be found.